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ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 920747-CA 
THOMAS WESLEY CALLAHAN, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated assault, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 
(1990). This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Is defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
focusing on trial counsel's alleged failure to pursue certain 
witnesses to testify on defendant's behalf, properly before this 
Court? 
In order to review such a claim, this Court must have before 
it evidence of how the testimony of the missing witnesses would 
create a reasonable probability of a different result for 
defendant. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 n. 26 (Utah 
1990). 
2. Was the fact of defendant's prior conviction for 
aggravated assault properly admitted into evidence? 
"Whether a piece of evidence is admissible is a question of 
law, and [the appellate court] always review[s] questions of law 
under a correctness standard." But when the rule of evidence 
"vests a measure of discretion in the trial court," the appellate 
court reverses only if it concludes that the trial court exercised 
its discretion "unreasonably." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 
781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991) . 
3. Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's verdict? 
"In reviewing a jury verdict to determine if it was based on 
sufficient evidence, we view the evidence presented and all 
inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the verdict. Where there is any evidence, including reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from it, from which findings of all 
the elements of the crime can be made beyond a reasonable doubt, 
our inquiry is complete and we will sustain the verdict." State v. 
Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 275 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted), cert. 
denied, 110 S.Ct. 1837 (1990). Accord State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 
232, 236 (Utah 1991) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, governing impeachment 
by evidence of conviction of crime, provides in pertinent part: 
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime 
shall be admitted if elicited from him or 
established by public record during cross-
examination but only if the crime (1) was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess 
of one year under the law under which he was 
convicted, and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence 
2 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false 
statement, regardless of the punishment. 
(b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction 
under this rule is not admissible if a period 
of more than ten years has elapsed, 
[exceptions explained]. 
Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, governing 
motions to remand for determination of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, may be found in addendum a at the end of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated assault for 
an incident that occurred on August 4, 1992, in which he struck 
Steven Dickerson on the head with a metal bar (R. 13). Following 
a jury trial on September 14, 1992, defendant was convicted as 
charged (R. 39). On October 19, 1992, the court sentenced 
defendant to not more than five years in the Utah State Prison and 
ordered restitution in the amount of $89.00 (R. 77-78). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 22, 1992, defendant Thomas Wesley Callahan began 
working for Carl Murdock as a helper in repairing auto body damage 
in a shop in Lindon, Utah (R. 139-41). At the beginning of that 
month, the 75-year-old Murdock had met defendant at church and, 
after hiring him, allowed defendant to live in his camper, use the 
bathroom facilities in the shop, and drive his pick-up truck. 
Defendant was given keys to both the shop and the truck (R. 142). 
After a couple of weeks, however, defendant became "very 
argumentative" and, on the morning of August 4th, Carl Murdock 
terminated defendant's employment (R. 143). 
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In the shop office that afternoon, Carl Murdock paid defendant 
for the work he had completed and asked defendant to return the 
truck and shop keys (R. 144-45). Defendant responded by demanding 
two weeks' severance pay, or about $400. Carl Murdock refused to 
pay, and left the office to tell his son, Ken, and Ken's helper, 
Steve Dickerson, about the interchange (R. 145). 
Steve Dickerson, over six feet tall and 225-30 pounds, 
accompanied Carl Murdock back to the shop office, where he stood in 
the doorway (R. 146, 162, 179). When defendant finished a 
telephone call, he asked Dickerson to move out of the doorway, 
which he did. Defendant went into the shop and picked up an iron 
bar measuring approximately one inch in diameter by 12 inches long 
from Murdock's tool box (R. 146, 163-64). Murdock and Dickerson 
followed him, the argument continued, and the parties eventually 
moved outside, where the demands for the keys resumed (R. 149, 165, 
202). According to Murdock, defendant raised the bar above his 
head and said, "What are you going to do about it?" (R. 146, 148). 
According to Dickerson, defendant pointed the bar in front of him, 
stating, "You stand back. You stay out of this" (R. 166-67). 
The argument finally reached an impasse after defendant 
emptied his pockets to demonstrate that he had no keys (R. 149, 
167, 228). At that point, Dickerson suggested that the police 
should be called (R. 150, 169, 231). Murdock turned away from 
defendant, presumably to go inside to make the telephone call.1 
1
 The police, however, had already been summoned by a boy who 
worked for Dennis Gray, the owner of the shop (R. 195). 
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Steve Dickerson testified: 
Tom proceeded — as Carl turned around, Tom — 
looked like to me that he was going to reach 
and hit one of us with the pipe, hit Carl. 
And so I went to grab the pipe from Tom's hand 
because he had it in his hand raised above his 
head. And at that time I didn't grab the pipe 
and I was hit on the head with it. 
(R. 170). In responding to a series of defense questions seeking 
to establish his role as the aggressor, Dickerson described his 
involvement in the dispute between Murdock and defendant by 
commenting: "All my point to be there was to make sure Carl wasn't 
going to get hurt. It wasn't my argument. And so when he had the 
pipe in the air I went to grab the pipe out of his hand is all. I 
wasn't going to let him try to hit me or hit Carl" (R. 173). 
During the course of the argument, Dennis Gray, the shop 
owner, was working nearby on a front-end loader (R. 193-94). He 
testified that "Tom had the bar and he was holding it up like this, 
and saying, 'Somebody around here is going to get hurt'" (R. 195). 
Gray stated that it seemed to him that Dickerson had his hand out 
and was demanding the keys. Then Dickerson ran up to defendant 
"quite aggressively," and "Tom hit him in the side of the head with 
this pipe" (R. 196). 
Dickerson testified, "And I remember as I got hit, it just 
like dazed me for a second and I pushed him [defendant] to the 
ground" (R. 170). Dickerson then ran off towards the shop to get 
away from defendant, who was chasing him with the iron bar raised 
in the air (R. 171-72, 196-97). By that time, Carl Murdock had 
returned to the scene and saw Dickerson "come by holding his head 
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and Tom raised with this bar trying to hit him again" (R. 150). 
Murdock tackled defendant, and defendant "swung" at Murdock, 
grazing his head (R. 151, 197). Dennis Gray then grabbed defendant 
around the neck and "tried to calm him down and tried to stop him 
from killing somebody with the bar" (R. 198). Gray released 
defendant, who took the iron bar to the camper and returned without 
it a few moments later, just as the police were arriving (R. 199). 
Defendant was arrested, charged with aggravated assault and, after 
a jury trial, convicted as charged. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to pursue witnesses to testify on defendant's behalf. 
However, defendant has failed to present any factual basis at all 
upon which this Court could meaningfully assess whether counsel's 
performance was deficient and whether the alleged deficiency 
actually prejudiced the fairness of defendant's trial. Before 
asking this court to adjudicate his ineffectiveness claim, 
defendant should have created a proper record in the trial court. 
If the trial court erred in admitting the fact of defendant's 
prior conviction for aggravated assault into evidence, the error 
was harmless. Defendant's credibility was undermined by a record 
replete with inconsistencies and conflicts between his testimony 
and that of the other witnesses. Defendant has wholly failed to 
show how, absent the brief exchange concerning defendant's prior 
conviction, there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result for defendant. 
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Because defendant has failed to marshal the evidence in 
support of the claim that the evidence was insufficent to support 
his conviction, he has waived consideration of the issue on appeal. 
ARGUMENT ' 
POINT ONE 
DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
CLAIM, FOCUSING ON TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO 
PURSUE WITNESSES TO TESTIFY ON DEFENDANT'S 
BEHALF, IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
Defendant asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to investigate, interview, and subpoena witnesses to 
testify on defendant's behalf. While he cites to the proper law 
for assessing ineffectiveness claims, defendant wholly fails to 
factually substantiate his claim. 
The two-part test articulated by the United States Supreme 
Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 
(1984) has been adopted by the Utah Supreme Court; 
"First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires 
showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the 
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must 
show that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense. This requires showing that 
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable." 
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064) (footnotes 
omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that a court need not 
determine the deficient performance prong if there has been no 
showing of prejudice. "'If it is easier to dispose of an 
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 
prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be 
followed.'" State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069). 
In this case, defendant has wholly failed to present any 
factual basis upon which a reviewing court could meaningfully 
assess whether defense counsel's alleged deficiencies actually 
prejudiced the fairness of defendant's trial. He asserts only that 
defendant identified to his trial attorney certain friendly 
witnesses, that his attorney failed to contact them, and that these 
witnesses would have corroborated defendant's version of what 
happened (Br. of App. at 11-12). He does not identify the names of 
the witnesses, nor does he provide any evidence concerning how 
these witnesses would have testified had they been called during 
trial. Defendant has not met the burden of showing that if these 
witnesses had testified, there was a "reasonable probability that 
the result of his trial would have been different." State v. 
Templin, 805 P.2d at 188 n.26 (citation omitted). 
Furthermore, the issue is not properly before this Court. 
Rule 23B of the Appellate Rules of Procedure provides that in a 
case such as this, prior to filing his appellate brief, counsel 
should have filed a motion to remand the case to the trial court 
for the presentation of evidence. See Utah R. App. P. 23B(a) or 
addendum a. The motion should have been accompanied by "affidavits 
alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on appeal that 
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show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney • . . and 
the claimed prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the 
claimed deficient performance." Utah R. App. P. 23B(b) or addendum 
a. By following this rule, defendant would have created the record 
necessary for a determination of his ineffectiveness claim by this 
Court. 
POINT TWO 
ANY ERROR THAT MAY HAVE BEEN COMMITTED IN 
PERMITTING THE FACT OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR 
CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED ASSAULT TO COME INTO 
EVIDENCE WAS HARMLESS. 
On cross-examination of defendant, the following exchange 
occurred: 
Prosecutor: Now, Mr. Callahan, have you been 
convicted of a felony before? 
Defendant: Yes, Ma'am. 
Prosecutor: What was that felony? 
Defendant: I believe it was classified as aggravated 
assault. 
Prosecutor: Okay, thank you. I have no further 
questions. 
R. 255. On appeal, defendant asserts that defense counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to this testimony, that the 
prosecuting attorney was guilty of prosecutorial misconduct for 
pursuing the testimony, and that the court erred in admitting the 
testimony without first engaging in the balancing of probativeness 
and prejudice required by rule 609(a), Utah Rules of Evidence (Br. 
9 
of App. at 18) .2 
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, as explained, 
defendant must show both that counsel's performance was deficient 
and that the deficient performance prejudiced defendant. State v. 
Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186-87 (Utah 1990). Similarly, to prove 
prosecutorial misconduct, defendant must show both misconduct by 
the prosecutor and resulting prejudice to defendant. State v. 
Viail, 840 P.2d 788, 795 (Utah App. 1992). In this case, even 
assuming arguendo that the first prong of each test has been met, 
defendant has failed to prove the prejudice prong. 
Assuming the court erred in failing to balance the prejudicial 
impact of the previous conviction against its probative value, the 
proper standard for reversal "is whether absent the error, there 
was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the 
defendant." State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 (Utah 1989). Accord 
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1038 (Utah 1987); State v. Wight, 
765 P.2d 12, 19 (Utah App. 1988). Thus, for all three claims made 
2
 Defendant also asserts that the prosecutor should be 
"sanctioned for offering the evidence before the evidentiary 
findings for its use required by Rule 609 had been made by the 
trial judge" (Br. of App. at 18). In essence, defendant wants the 
very act of asking about a prior conviction categorized as 
prosecutorial misconduct. Plainly, rule 609(a) contemplates that 
some prior convictions will be appropriately admitted. It does not 
contemplate per se categories of exclusion. Furthermore, it is 
defendant's responsibility to move for exclusion of the testimony 
or to register a contemporaneous objection, neither of which is 
evidenced by the record. Only then does the burden shift to the 
prosecutor to show "that the probative value of admitting the 
convictions, as far as shedding light on the defendant's 
credibility, outweighs the prejudicial effect to the defendant." 
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986). 
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by defendant, the proper test is whether, absent the evidence of 
prior conviction, the result of the trial would likely be different 
for defendant. 
In this case, the evidence was undisputed that defendant 
struck the victim. The only question was whether the attack 
constituted an assault or an act of self-defense. Defendant in 
essence argues that the question was so close that evidence of his 
prior conviction sufficed to undermine his credibility with the 
jury and tip the scales towards conviction. But for evidence of 
his prior conviction, defendant believes he would have been 
acquitted. 
The case, however, is not nearly as close as defendant 
asserts. Indeed, the evidence that defendant's story is not 
credible is so substantial that evidence of his prior conviction 
would have had a negligible impact on a jury. Defendant's 
testimony was long and rambling, a detailed narrative account of 
events leading up to the assault on Steve Dickerson (see, e.g., R. 
220-25, 233-38). In many instances, defendant's testimony was 
diametrically opposed to that of the witnesses. For example, 
defendant testified in some detail about a conversation of well 
over an hour that he had on the Saturday evening before the 
incident with Dennis Gray. Defendant testified that he remembered 
it was a Saturday because he was going to a dance and wanted Gray 
to finish quickly so that defendant could leave for the dance. 
According to defendant, during the conversation Gray offered him a 
job (R. 247). Dennis Gray was subsequently asked whether he had 
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ever discussed future employment with defendant. Gray responded 
unequivocally: "No way, no. . . . I have a few helpers that help me 
occasionally, but I don't have people working for me full-time, and 
I wouldn't have hired Tom anyhow" (R. 256). He also stated that he 
did not "believe in working on Saturdays" and did not come to the 
shop on Saturday (R. 257). 
Defendant also testified in detail about an object with which 
he said Dickerson struck him across the chest prior to defendant 
striking Dickerson in self-defense (R. 231-32, 249-50). He 
described it as "a wood or metal object," "about four foot long," 
"a colored object . . . blue or turquoise green," that eventually 
ended up on the ground (R. 249-50). Steve Dickerson testified that 
he pushed defendant to the ground after defendant had struck him, 
but that at no time did he have any object in his hands (R. 269). 
Dennis Gray testified that the only person who had a weapon was 
defendant (R. 259). The responding police officer testified that 
he looked for the object that defendant described but was unable to 
locate it (R. 265). 
Defendant further testified that when he took the iron bar 
into the camper after the incident, he just tossed it down, either 
on the bed or near the television, and began to pack up his things. 
He then moved the bar and didn't remember where he put it (R. 236) . 
In trying to explain how the bar ended up hidden under the blanket 
on the bed, defendant stated, "My bed wasn't made. I'm sorry, but 
I'm a bachelor. I know ladies like to make their bed, but I slept 
in it, so I left mine unfolded" (R. 254). Defendant in essence 
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intimated that because the bedclothes were awry, they could have 
easily concealed a bar that was tossed onto them* In contrast, 
both Dennis Gray and the police officer testified that the weapon 
was "shoved down underneath" defendant's fully made bed, presumably 
with the intent to hide it (R. 259, 263). 
In addition to these specific points of conflict, other areas 
of defendant's testimony are either so detailed or so overblown as 
to bring his own credibility into serious question. He describes 
the incident at issue in extreme detail, as if it were a movie 
unfolding frame by frame, noting every nuance of what he saw, 
heard, felt, and did. See addendum b or R. 231-238. On its face, 
the extreme detail alone is enough to raise questions about either 
defendant's extraordinary memory or the truth of what he asserts. 
Further, defendant describes three accidents that occurred 
during his short employment tenure, all of which speak to physical 
limitations that would render the assault difficult or impossible. 
Two co-workers precipitated the first accident, causing defendant's 
right hand to be "slit . . . about an inch and a half, . . . all 
the way to the bone" (R. 215). Carl Murdock caused the second 
incident, resulting in defendant's hand being "jerked . 
completely out of joint" (R. 215). The third injury occurred while 
defendant was holding a piece of equipment. In this instance, 
Dennis Gray made the error, and the equipment, according to 
defendant, "jerked my arm and pulled the tendons and ligaments all 
the way down and popped my wrist" (R. 216). In all three 
instances, defendant was victimized by the apparent carelessness of 
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co-workers, but chose not to seek medical help for fear of being 
labelled accident-prone and thereby losing his job (R. 242-43). 
Defendant presumably testified about these injuries to show that he 
was physically unable to raise his arm and strike the blow that 
injured Dickerson.3 
In combination, the inconsistencies and conflicts described 
seriously undermine defendant's credibility. And, once the jury 
chose not to believe defendant, there simply was not a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for him, even absent the 
brief exchange concerning defendant's prior conviction. Indeed, 
any negative influence derived from admitting the fact of 
defendant's prior conviction pales in comparison to the prejudice 
resulting from the multiple instances of conflicting testimony. 
Because defendant has not met his burden of showing how admission 
of the prior conviction prejudiced him, his conviction should be 
affirmed. 
POINT THREE 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HIS CLAIM THAT THE 
EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT HIS 
CONVICTION, HE HAS WAIVED CONSIDERATION OF THE 
ISSUE ON APPEAL. 
Defendant asserts that the evidence was legally insufficient 
to convict him of aggravated assault. In order for this Court to 
consider such a claim, defendant "must marshal the evidence 
supporting the . . . findings and demonstrate how the evidence, 
3
 Notably, however, defendant's theory was self-defense, not 
that he did not hit Dickerson. 
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including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is 
insufficient to support the disputed findings." State v. Peterson, 
198 Utah Adv. Rep. 56, 58 (Utah App. 1992). If a defendant fails 
to marshal the evidence, the right to have the claim considered on 
appeal is waived. State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 
1990). Accord State v. Galleqos, No. 890513-CA, slip op. at 6 
(Utah App. April 8, 1993). 
In this case, defendant simply recites that the evidence was 
insufficient and offers conflicting testimony to support his 
preferred theory of self-defense (See Br. of App. at 18). It is, 
of course, the jury's prerogative both to assess the credibility of 
the witnesses and to weigh their testimony. State v. Martinez, 7 09 
P. 2d 355, 356 (Utah 1985). Certainly, had the jury believed 
defendant's version of what happened and disbelieved all of the 
other witnesses, it could have concluded that defendant's assault 
was rooted in self-defense and acquitted him. But they chose not 
to do so, and defendant has neither marshalled the evidence in 
support of the trial court's decision, nor shown how that evidence 
and the inferences that may properly be drawn from it are so 
"inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
443, 444 (Utah 1983). Under such circumstances, this Court should 
not disturb the jury's decision. State v. Moore, 802 P.2d at 738. 
Accord State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Galleqos, slip op. at 7. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2#_ day of April, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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foregoing brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to Lee C. 
Rasmussen and H. Wayne Green, Attorneys for Defendant, 211 East 300 
South, Suite 213, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, this 2ffday of 
April, 1993. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 23B 
Rule 23B. Motion to remand for determination of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel. 
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an appeal in a criminal case 
may move the court to remand the case to the trial court for the purpose of 
entering findings of fact relevant to a claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. The motion shall be available only upon an allegation of facts constituting 
ineffective assistance of counsel not fully appearing in the record on appeal. 
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellant's brief. Upon a 
showing of good cause, the court may permit a motion to be filed after the 
filing of the appellant's brief. In no event shall the court permit a motion to be 
filed after oral argument. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court from 
remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any time if the claim 
has been raised and the motion would have been available to a party. 
(b) Content of motion; response; reply. The content of the motion shall 
conform to the requirements of Rule 23. The motion shall include or be accom-
panied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on appeal 
that show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The affidavits 
shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered by the appel-
lant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. A response shall be filed 
within 20 days after the motion is filed. Any reply shall be filed within 10 
days after the response is filed. 
(c) Order of the court Upon consideration of the motion, affidavits, and 
memoranda, the court may order that the case be temporarily remanded to 
the trial court for the purpose of entering findings of fact relevant to the claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. If it appears to the appellate court that the 
attorney of record on the appeal faces a conflict of interest upon remand, the 
court shall direct that counsel withdraw and that new counsel for the appel-
lant be appointed or retained. 
(d) Effect on appeal. Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall be 
vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand under this rule. Other proce-
dural steps required by these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand, 
unless a stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the parties 
or upon the court's motion. 
(e) Proceedings before the trial court Upon remand the trial court shall 
conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the findings of fact 
necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Eviden-
tiary hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as practicable 
after remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the proponent of the 
fact. The standard of proof shall be a preponderance of the evidence. The trial 
court shall enter written findings of fact. 
(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the conclusion of all 
proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the trial court and the court 
reporter shall prepare the record of the supplemental proceedings as required 
by these rules. If the record of the original proceedings before the trial court 
has been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial court shall 
immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon prepa-
ration of the supplemental record. If the record of the original proceedings 
before the trial court has not been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk 
of the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon 
the preparation of the entire record. 
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ADDENDUM B 
; (INDICATING ON DRAWING). 
; THEN CARL TURNED AROUND AND SAID, "WELL, I 
; GUESS" — HE SAID, "I GUESS I'M JUST GOING TO HAVE TO 
i CALL THE LAW." AND I SAID, "GO AHEAD." I WAS STARTING 
5 TO CALL THE LAW A LITTLE WHILE AGO WHEN I WISH I HAD, 
6 MYSELF. 
7 NOW CARL WAS LEAVING. HE'S RIGHT HERE AND 
i CARL STARTS TO LEAVE. AT THIS POINT DENNIS GRAY HAD 
9 MOVED OVER HERE RIGHT AROUND IN HERE (INDICATING ON 
j DRAWING). THEN CARL WAS LEAVING. HE KEEPS TELLING ME — 
.: TELLING EVERYBODY HE'S GOING TO PROTECT CARL. HE TOOK 
.2 OFF. THIS IS AN OPEN FIRE PIT THAT DENNIS GRAY HAS OUT 
.3 THERE, AND THERE'S ROPE AND STUFF LIKE THAT IN THERE. HE 
.4 TOOK OFF AT A GOOD TROT RIGHT OVER THERE. AT THAT POINT 
.5 I WAS TURNING TO GO TO THE HOUSE AND I WAS ABOUT THIS 
.6 WAY. AND I CAUGHT HIM OUT OF THE CORNER OF MY EYE TAKING 
:7 OFF AT A FAST TROT FOR THE RUBBLE. AND I TURNED AND 
.8 SAID, "DENNIS, HE'S GOING FOR A WEAPON, HE'S GOING TO GET 
:9 SOMETHING TO HIT ME WITH." I SAID THAT FOUR OR FIVE 
iO TIMES. HE FINDS SOMETHING ABOUT FOUR FOOT LONG. I DON'T 
•1 KNOW IF IT WAS METAL OR WOOD. IT WAS ABOUT THIS BIG, 
;2 WHETHER IT WAS THREE-QUARTERS OF AN INCH OR INCH AND A 
•3 HALF. BUT IT WAS RIGHT OVER HERE AND ABOUT FOUR FOOT 
•4 LONG. AND THEN HE TAKES OFF AND STARTS COMING TOWARDS 
•5 ME. AND I SAID, "DENNIS" ~ DENNIS DIDN'T DO ANYTHING. 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
1 ANYWAYS, HE STARTS COMING TOWARDS ME. AND DENNIS IS KIND 
2 OF LIKE THIS. I DON'T KNOW WHAT HE'S THINKING OF. I'M 
3 ASKING HIM TO STOP HIM, PLEADING WITH HIM. HE COMES 
\ RIGHT UP RIGHT ABOUT HERE IN FULL STRIDE. 
5 Q. WHO IS THAT? 
5 A. THAT MAN RIGHT THERE (WITNESS POINTING). 
7 Q. JUST DRAW ON THE BOARD. 
3 A. HE COMES UP AND HE RAISES THAT STICK OR 
9 METAL, WHATEVER IT WAS, AND COME DOWN ON ME. I PUT THE 
: BAR UP, GO LIKE THIS. AND WHEN HE RECHECKS — AT THAT 
1 POINT DENNIS GRAY STEPS OVER HERE. AND WHEN HE RECHECKED 
: I TURNED TO DENNIS AND SAID, "DENNIS, STOP HIM." MY HEAD 
3 WAS TURNED. THAT WAS MY MISTAKE. AT THAT POINT HE 
4 CROSSED THE THING ACROSS MY CHEST. MY PAPERS WENT 
: FLYING, BOTH MY PENCILS. MY PEN, WHICH THIS MAN WAS 
.: SUPPOSED TO TAKE FROM THE OFFICER AND DID NOT — I HANDED 
* IT LATER ON TO THE OFFICER, THE OTHER OFFICER. 
Q. YOU'RE SAYING MR. DICKERSON HAD HIT YOU 
• : ACROSS THE CHEST? 
: A. YES, SIR. AND THEY HAD FOUND A TWO INCH OR 
1 SO BRUISE RIGHT HERE. HAD THE PAPERS AND THINGS NOT BEEN 
• IN THERE IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN A BIGGER BRUISE OR I MIGHT 
; HAVE BROKE A RIB. BUT THE PAPERS WERE THERE AND PROBABLY 
•J SAVED ME FROM GETTING SERIOUS INJURY. 
• AT THAT POINT, THEN ~ EXCUSE ME. MY MOUTH 
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; GETS DRY. 
; THEN I BUCKLE DOWN A LITTLE BIT, COME DOWN, 
;« NOT SO MUCH IN DEFENSE BUT FROM THE BLOW. AND HE'S BACK 
i AGAIN, AND THE OBJECT HE HAD IN HIS HAND I WOULD SAY NOW 
j IS ABOUT TWO AND A HALF FEET LONG. WHETHER IT WAS WOOD 
5 OR METAL, WHETHER THE WOOD BROKE OR THE METAL BENT, I 
i DON'T KNOW. AND HE HIT AGAIN AND IT CAME ACROSS THE BAR 
3 AND HIT THE BOTTLE AND THE BOTTLE HIT ME. I GUESS THE 
i BAR AND THE BOTTLE CUSHIONED THE BLOW BECAUSE IT WASN'T 
.; ALL THAT DAMAGING TO ME. AT THAT POINT I TOOK THE BAR 
.1 AND I SWUNG. I MISSED, ABOUT 8 TO 12 INCHES. I DIDN'T 
.: KNOW HOW BAD MY ARM WAS REALLY HURTING. AND I THOUGHT: 
.3 OH BOY, I'M IN TROUBLE. I KIND OF MOVED BACK JUST A 
1 LITTLE BIT. IT LOOKED LIKE HE WAS COMING IN TO ME AND I 
.: SWUNG AGAIN. AT THAT POINT HE HIT ME RIGHT DOWN HERE AND 
.: I WENT DOWN HARD. 
-
1
 Q. WHEN YOU SAY HE WAS COMING INTO, WHAT DO YOU 
.5 MEAN BY THAT? 
•3 A. HE CAME IN TO TACKLE ME AND TAKE ME DOWN, I 
.: MEAN TOTAL AGGRESSION. AND I HIT MY NECK AND MY HEAD 
•i PRETTY HARD. AND THEN WE WERE DOWN AND I WAS TRYING TO 
2 GET UP. AND I REALIZED I MUST HAVE HIT MY HEAD HARDER 
3 THAN I KNEW BECAUSE I HAD LOST THE BAR. AND I DIDN'T 
•J KNOW I HAD LOST IT, BECAUSE AS I WAS TRYING TO GET UP I 
•i HAD TO SCOOP THE BAR BACK UP. AND THEN MY BODY WAS 
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SIDEWAYS TO HIM, AND I WAS TRYING TO BREAK LOOSE AND MY 
; FEET WERE LAYING ON THE GROUND. AND I SWUNG IT KIND OF 
. ; BLINDLY TOWARD HIM. I DON'T KNOW IF I HIT HIM THE SECOND 
: ONE OR THE THIRD ONE; WHATEVER. I KNOW I MISSED HIM THE 
: FIRST ONE. BUT I FELT LIKE I MIGHT HAVE HIT HIM ONCE. 
• I'M NOT SURE. AT THAT POINT; WE WERE BOTH RIGHT HERE. 
ERASE THIS NOW. 
OKAY, HE GETS UP AND HE TAKES OFF RIGHT 
• AROUND HERE. WHEN HE GETS UP I'M THINKING HE'S GOING 
AFTER ANOTHER WEAPON. HE CAME AFTER ME ONCE, I FIGURE 
.; HE'S GOING AFTER ANOTHER ONE. SO I GET UP AND I TAKE OFF 
: THROUGH HERE. AND HE'S LIKE THIS (DEMONSTRATING). AND 
; AGAIN, I DIDN'T KNOW WHAT KIND OF SHAPE I WAS IN, BECAUSE 
.; HE WAS JUST MAKING TRACKS. HE WAS COMING HERE. CARL WAS 
.5 COMING RIGHT AROUND HERE, AND I WAS COMING DOWN HERE, AND 
.5 AS FAR AS I COULD GO. AND HE WAS LIKE THIS. 
.' NOW SOMEWHERE IN HERE — NOW I'M MOVING AT A 
5 PRETTY GOOD PACE. CARL SEES ME AND GOES INTO A FIGHT 
•i POSITION. THEN HE VERY — THIS IS ALL VERY QUICK. THE 
• J ADRENALIN IS PUMPING, MIND IS GOING 90 MILES AN HOUR. 
•i THEN HE GOES INTO A TACKLE POSITION, AND HE JUST WENT 
•2 AHEAD AND CROUCHED DOWN LIKE THIS. IN THE PROCESS I SAW 
3 MR. DICKERSON, WHAT LOOKED LIKE RIGHT AROUND IN HERE, PUT 
•4 HIS HAND TO HIS HEAD. HE'S KIND OF LIKE THIS. I THINK 
•5 IT WAS ~ AND I PRESUME THAT I HIT HIM. AND I DIDN'T 
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; WANT TO HURT CARL SO I TRIED TO SLOW UP AND PULL UP. AND 
: WE HIT ABOUT THAT POINT. IT WASN'T REALLY HARD. AND WE 
? CONNECTED RIGHT HERE (INDICATING ON DRAWING). I WENT 
i AHEAD AND BENT ON OVER HIM LIKE THIS. NOW IF THE BAR 
5 WENT ACROSS HIS HEAD, I DON'T KNOW. BUT I WAS TRYING NOT 
5 TO HURT HIM AND I NEVER EVER SWUNG AT CARL. 
AT THAT POINT WE GOT UP, BOTH OF US. NOW I 
5 DON'T KNOW IF HE WAS FOLLOWING ME RIGHT THERE AT THAT 
i TIME OR NOT. I JUST STARTED — I WAS GOING BACK TO MY 
.: HOUSE. AND I WAS TAKING THE BAR BECAUSE I WASN'T SURE --
.1 THERE'S CARL WITH HIS MIND. I DON'T KNOW WHAT HE'S GOING 
.: TO DO ACTUALLY. AND I DON'T KNOW IF STEVEN IS REALLY 
5 HURT THAT HE WON'T GET A WEAPON AND COME BACK OUT, 
I BECAUSE I DON'T KNOW IF I'VE HURT HIM OR IT'S JUST 
5 BOUNCED OFF HIS HEAD. I MEAN HE'S RUNNING PRETTY GOOD, 
.5 SO HE'S STILL WHAT I CALL A LIVE WIRE. THEN I GO BACK UP 
1
 TO HERE. DENNIS GRAY IS RIGHT HERE. AND EVIDENTLY CARL 
.5 FOLLOWED ME. THEN I HEAR SOME NOISE AND I TURN AROUND 
.5 BECAUSE I'M NOT SURE WHAT'S GOING ON, IF HE'S COMING BACK 
• 3 OUT OR WHAT. AND I TURN AROUND AND HERE'S KEN MURDOCK 
•I RUNNING FULL SPEED RIGHT FOR ME, RIGHT THERE. 
•2 AT THAT POINT I DON'T KNOW WHAT HE'S GOING TO 
•3 DO. HE SHOVES ME AND GRABS ME AT THE SAME TIME RIGHT 
4 HERE. I KIND OF MOVE AND WITH MY ARM PUSHES HIS ARM 
5 ASIDE. AND STOOD BACK AND I SAID, "THERE DOESN'T NEED TO 
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BE ANYMORE OF THIS." AND RIGHT THEN HE STOPPED. HE 
SEEMED TO STOPPED, SO I MOVE BACK. I'M WATCHING AND NOT 
POSITIVE WHAT'S GOING ON. THIS IS ALL PRETTY EXCITING 
• RIGHT NOW. I TURNED TO GO BACK TO MY HOUSE. AT THAT 
• TIME DENNIS GRAY, IN WHAT I CALL A GREAT POSE, SAYS TO 
f ME, "I COULD BREAK YOU IN TWO." AT THAT POINT I JUST 
• KIND OF LOOK AT HIM AND JUST KIND OF SHOOK MY HEAD AND 
• THOUGHT TO MYSELF, WHY DIDN'T HE JUST STOP THIS WHOLE 
: THING. IT'S HIS PLACE, HE COULD HAVE DONE THAT. 
.:• (WITNESS EMOTIONAL) 
.1 ANYWAY, I MOVE BACK TO MY HOUSE RIGHT HERE. 
.: I HAVE THE BAR WITH ME, BECAUSE ONCE AGAIN, I WASN'T SURE 
.3 WITH ALL THE EXCITEMENT AND EVERYTHING — WELL, ANYWAY. 
.4 AND I WALKED IN HERE AND MY THOUGHTS WERE, I'LL JUST PACK 
:5 MY STUFF. AND I REMEMBER COMING IN, AND I LAID THE BAR 
.6 ON THIS COUNTER. AND I GOT MY BAG OFF THE — IT WAS UP 
.7 IN THE FRONT, SO I GOT IT OFF AND STARTED PACKING. AND 
.8 SOME OF THE THINGS WERE HERE IN THE WAY, AND I MOVED IT. 
:9 I WASN'T POSITIVE WHERE I MOVED IT, BUT I'LL TAKE HIS 
:0 WORD WHERE IT WAS. I DON'T KNOW IF I PUT IT ON THE TV OR 
.1 ON THE BED. I TOLD HIM I DIDN'T REMEMBER WHERE IT WAS. 
22 AT THAT POINT I WAS KIND OF SHOOK UP. AND I 
23 WAS IN HERE. AND I HEARD SOME NOISE AND I LOOKED OUT THE 
24 WINDOW AND SAW THE POLICE, SO I CAME OUT RIGHT ABOUT IN 
25 HERE. THERE WAS A POLICEMAN RIGHT HERE AND ONE RIGHT 
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; HERE. AND I PRESUME THIS GENTLEMAN WAS IN HERE TALKING. 
; THIS GENTLEMAN SITTING HERE WAS IN TALKING TO THE OTHER 
; PEOPLE, I PRESUME. 
i I START TELLING THIS OFFICER WHAT WAS 
: HAPPENING. THE OTHER OFFICER CAME UP, AND IN THE PROCESS 
: I LOOKED DOWN AND OF COURSE MY STUFF WAS GONE AND I HAD 
• THIS BENT PEN. IT WAS BENT. I SAID, "HERE'S THIS BENT 
5 PEN," AND I HANDED IT TO THIS OFFICER. IN THE PROCESS 
i THIS OFFICER SITTING HERE COMES OUT AND SAYS, "WERE YOU 
j IN A FIGHT?" AND I SAID, "YES, SIR, IT WAS RIGHT HERE." 
I AND I START TO TELL HIM, AND THEN DENNIS GRAY COMES UP 
: RIGHT ABOUT HERE AND SAYS HE WANTS HIS KEY. AND I HAND 
3 HIM HIS KEY AND THE OFFICER SAYS, "DO YOU HAVE HIS KEY?" 
; AND I SAID, "YES, S I R . " AND HE SAID, "WELL, GIVE HIM HIS 
3 KEY." AND I TOOK THE KEY — I HAD FORGOTTEN ABOUT THIS 
: PART OVER HERE. THE KEY WAS THERE. IT WAS ON THE 
* BARREL. CARL WAS RIGHT THERE WITH ME. THE KEY TO 
5 DENNIS'S OFFICE, NOT THE KEY TO HIS TOYOTA. AND THEN HE 
5 SAID, "GIVE HIM THE KEY," AND SO I GAVE HIM THE KEY. AND 
•J THE OFFICER SAID, "WHY DIDN'T YOU GIVE HIM HIS KEY AWHILE 
•i AGO?" AND I SAID, "DENNIS GRAY DIDN'T ASK ME FOR MY 
•-
1
 KEY." AND HE SAID, "YOU'RE UNDER ARREST." AND I SAID, 
.3 "DON'T YOU WANT TO HEAR WHAT HAPPENED?" AND HE SAID, 
•* "NO." AND THE OTHER OFFICER MADE THE GESTURE TO HIM, AND 
•5 SAID, "HERE'S THE BENT PEN, DO YOU WANT IT?" HE SAID, 
nntippi T* ninwt^n r*r%r\ 
"NO." HE ALREADY HAD HIS EVIDENCE. HE ALREADY HAD HIS 
CASE. HE DIDN'T CARE ABOUT ME. HE TURNED RIGHT AROUND 
— AND I SAID, "WHAT ABOUT MY PAPERS AND PENCILS?" THERE 
ARE BROKEN PENCILS. THEY WERE ON THE GROUND, OR STICKS, 
WHATEVER IT WAS, WAS ON THE GROUND. HE SAID, "DON'T YOU 
TAKE CARE OF THAT, WE'LL WORRY ABOUT IT." SO I'M 
HANDCUFFED AND I GO DOWN HERE AND THEY TOOK ME TO A 
PATROL CAR. 
Q. WHY DON'T GO AHEAD AND TAKE YOUR SEAT AT THE 
STAND. 
MR. BAINUM: I DON'T HAVE ANY FURTHER 
QUESTIONS. 
THE COURT: VERY WELL, YOU MAY CROSS-EXAMINE. 
MS. LAYCOCK: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MS. LAYCOCK: 
Q. MR. CALLAHAN, AM I TO UNDERSTAND THAT 
THROUGHOUT THIS ENTIRE ALTERCATION YOU WERE ALWAYS THE 
PEACEFUL ONE? 
A. PEACEFUL? IN THE OFFICE I REALIZED THAT THE 
SITUATION COULD GET ESCALATED. I TRIED TO KEEP MY 
COMPOSURE. 
Q. YOU REPEATEDLY TOLD US YOU JUST KEPT SAYING 
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